Scenarios without proper validation
Scenarios of vulnerabilities targeting relayers (filler) in hybrid cross-chain and account abstraction systems. These attacks exploit the dual role relayers play as both liquidity providers and transaction bundlers, causing financial harm through uncompensated gas consumption.
1. Unfunded Account Exploitation

Root Cause
This vulnerability occurs when relayers fail to implement adequate fund verification before executing UserOperations. Unlike standalone ERC-4337 bundlers that perform comprehensive pre-execution validation, hybrid relayers often prioritize cross-chain profitability calculations while neglecting account abstraction validation requirements. The EntryPoint contract performs fund verification during execution, but by that point, the relayer has already committed gas costs that become unrecoverable when transactions revert.
Attack Flow
Attacker creates a
UserOperationwith an unfunded smart account (zero balance, no paymaster)Relayerperforms basic profitability assessment for the cross-chain component without validating account fundsRelayersubmits the operation toEntryPoint.handleOps()Transaction reverts during prepayment validation when
EntryPointattempts to charge gas feesRelayerloses gas costs without receiving compensation from the failed operation
Mitigation
Implement comprehensive fund verification as part of the hybrid profitability assessment:
Entity reputation tracking per ERC-7562 should also be implemented:
2. Simulation-Execution Mismatch

Root Cause
This vulnerability exploits the temporal gap between relayer simulation and on-chain execution. Smart contracts can implement conditional logic using environment-dependent opcodes (block.timestamp, block.number, block.difficulty) that execute differently at simulation time versus execution time. Relayer performing profitability analysis during simulation may significantly underestimate actual gas consumption, leading to unprofitable operations.
Attack Flow
Attacker deploys a contract with conditional logic based on
block.timestampor similar environment variablesContract executes normally during simulation but consumes excessive gas when specific conditions are met
Attacker creates cross-chain intent targeting the malicious contract as recipient
During
relayersimulation, contract appears to consume normal gas amountsAt actual execution time, environmental conditions trigger high gas consumption
Relayersuffers unexpected gas costs that exceed fee revenue
Example code:
Mitigation
Implement ERC-7562 opcode restrictions and enhanced gas estimation with safety margins:
Opcode Validation: Restrict access to environment-dependent opcodes during UserOperation validation:
Block
ORIGIN,GASPRICE,BLOCKHASH,COINBASE,TIMESTAMP,NUMBER,PREVRANDAO,GASLIMIT,BASEFEEImplement storage access sandboxing via
SLOAD/SSTORErestrictions
Enhanced Gas Estimation:
Simulation-Based Validation:
Implement circuit breakers that halt operations when validation failure rates exceed configured thresholds, protecting against systematic exploitation attempts.
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